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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of KENNETH G. SCRIVENER,
Deceased.

SHIRLEY S. SCRIVENER, Executrix of the Estate of Kenneth G.
Scrivener, Deceased,
Appellant,

Case No.

8186

vs.
ALBERT SCRIVENER and l\IHS.
ALBERT SCRIVENER, as Trustees for Gregory Scrivener, a Minor,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Kenneth G. Scrivener is the deceased father of
Gregory Scrivener, a rninor six years of age. Gregory's
mother was Ruth E. Scrivener whose marriage with
Kenneth G. Scrivener terminated by divorce. Following
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the divorce and on the 15th day of October, 1952, the
said Kenneth G. Scrivener married one Shirlee S.
Scrivener. A few months later, to wit, on the 3rd day
of January, 1953, the said Kenneth G. Scrivener died as
a result of an accident and left surviving him as his sole
and only heirs at law his said son, Gregory, who was six
years of age, and the said Shirlee S. Scrivener. The said
Gregory Scrivener had never resided with nor made his
home with the said Shirlee S. Scrivener.
Albert Scrivener and Mrs. Albert Scrivener are the
surviving parents of Kenneth G. Scrivener, deceased,
and the grandparents of Gregory Scrivener.
During his lifetime the said Kenneth G. Scrivener
had taken out two life insurance policies on his life-one
in the sum of $10,000.00 which was taken out while the
said Kenneth G. Scrivener was in the Army, and the
other policy in the face amount of $5,000.00 with the
Prudential Life Insurance Company, the same being
Policy No. 17655702. A photostatic copy of the Prudential Life Insurance Policy was introduced in the record
and is made a part of the record on appeal (Exhibit 1).
The cover sheet of this policy, among other things, contains the following information:
"Policy No.
17 655 702
Insured:
Kenneth G. Scrivener
The Prudential Insurance Company of A1nerica
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Face Amount of Insurance:
$5,000.00
Policy Date:
June 20, 1949
:Modified Whole Life Policy"
At the time of the death of the said Kenneth G.
Scrivener both the $10,000.00 service policy aforementioned and the Prudential Life Policy were payable to
the estate of the decedent. The sum of $10,000.00 was in
due course paid under the service policy to the estate.
The Prudential Life Insurance Company paid to the estate the sum of $9,995.99 computed as follows :
Amount of Policy No. 17655702
$5,000.00
Paid-up Additions
10.69
Premiums Deducted
$14.70
Accidental Death Benefits
5,000.00
Total

9,995.99

(Exhibit 2)
All of the aforementioned facts were stipulated to by
the parties in writing (R. 19, 20 and 21).
The said Kenneth G. Scrivener on the 2nd day of
January, 1953, or one day prior to his fatal accident,
made his last will and testament (R. 1 and 2), which was
thereafter admitted to probate in the District Court of
Salt Lake County, Htate of Utah, and the said Shirlee
S. Scrivener was appointed executrix of the said last will
and testament. The third paragraph of the decedent's
last will and testament read as follows, to-wit:
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"THIRD, I hereby give, devise, and bequeath
to my parents, MR. and MR.S. ALBERT SCRIVENER, or the survivor of them, of Rochester,
New York, my $5,000.00 life ins1trance with The
Prudential Insurance Company of America,
Policy 17655702, to be held in trust for the uses
and purposes hereinafter set forth:
They, the said MR. and l\1RS. ALBERT
SCRIVENER, or the survivor, as such trustees, shall have full power to manage and control the $5,000.00 principal derhed from sa.id
life insurance policy, with the power to invest
or reinvest same as they may see fit so to do
for the purpose of educating, maintaining
and supporting n1y son, GREGORY SCRIVENER, until such time as he shall reach the
age of twenty-one years, at which time the
said trustees are to pay over to my son,
GREGORY, the balance, if any, of the $5,000.00, and after such payment, the said
trustees shall then be discharged from any
further liability on their part. PROVIDED,
that if my parents predecease me, or that if
they decease prior to the execution of said
trust, I then request my brother, CLIFFORD
C. SCRIVENER, of St. Louis, ~lissouri, be
appointed substitute trustee, to be succeeded
by my sister, l\fARY ELLEN WOODS of
Rochester, New York, if need be."
Shirlee S. Scrivener as such executrix tendered to
the said Mr. and Mrs. Albert Scrivener the sum of
$5,000.00 in full, final and complete payment of the said
bequest, claiming that was all that was due under the
terms and provisions of the decedent's last will and testaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ment. Albert Scrivener and his wife refused to accept
said sum and claiined that they were entitled as trustees
to the entire proceeds of said policy and filed a petition
herein setting forth their claim (R. 5, 6 and 7). Upon
the filing of said petition an order to show cause was
issued and served upon the said Shirlee S. Scrivener,
executrix, requiring her to show cause, if any she had,
why as such executrix she should not be compelled to
pay to Albert Scrivener and Mrs. Albert Scrivener as
trustees for Gregory Scrivener the sum of $9,995.99, or
the entire amount of the proceeds realized by the estate
from the Prudential Insurance Company of America (R.
3). The said Shirlee S. Scrivener filed an answer to the
petition (R. 8, 9, 10 and 11), and in due course the matter
came on for hearing before the Honorable A. H. Ellett,
Judge, at which time the matter was submitted on the
stipulated facts aforementioned and upon a photostatic
copy of the insurance policy with the Prudential Life
Insurance Company aforementioned (Exhibit 1), and the
insurance company's computation of its manner of payment (Exhibit 2). The lower court made and entered its
order awarding to Albert Scrivener and Mrs. Albert
Scrivener as trustees for Gregory Scrivener the entire
proceeds of the Prudential Life Insurance policy in the
sum of $9,995.99, all as more fully reflected in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 12, 13, 14 and
1;)), and Judgment (R. 16 and 17).
It is from this Judgment awarding to Albert
Scrivener and Mrs. Albert Scrivener as trustees for
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Gregory Scrivener the entire proceeds of the Prudential
Life Insurance policy that the executrix takes her appeal.
As indicated by appellant's counsel, there is no dispute in
the facts as all of the material facts were admitted by
the stipulation or covered by the exhibits. The only
question involved on this appeal is whether the lower
court properly awarded to Albert Scrivener and Mrs.
Albert Scrivener, trustees for Gregory Scrivener, the
entire proceeds of the Prudential Life Insurance policy.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT NO. I
THE WILL
FOR GREGORY
POLICY AND
THERETO THE
POLICY.

MADE A SPECIFIC BEQUEST IN TRUST
OF THE PRUDENTIAL LIFE INSURANCE
CARRIED WITH IT AS AN INCIDENT
DOUBLE INDEMNITY PROVISION OF THE

POINT NO.2
THE DECEASED DID NOT CONSIDER THE CONTRACTS FOR LIFE INSURANCE AND DOUBLE INDEMNITY AS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT BUT MADE A
SPECIFIC BEQUEST OF THE ENTIRE PROCEEDS OF THE
POLICY IN TRUST FOR GREGORY.
POINT NO.3
THE BEQUEST IN TRUST FOR GREGORY INCLUDED
THE DOUBLE INDEMNITY BENEFIT.
POINT NO.4
BY MAKING HIS EST ATE THE BENEFICIARY OF THE
INSURANCE POLICY THE DECEDENT EVIDENCED NO
INTENTION TO LIMIT THE AMOUNT TO GO TO GREGORY.
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ARGUMENT

,U\1

tto.l

POINT NO. I
THE WILL
FOR GREGORY
POLICY AND
THERETO THE
POLICY.

MADE A SPECIFIC BEQUEST IN TRUST
OF THE PRUDENTIAL LIFE INSURANCE
CARRIED WITH IT AS AN INCIDENT
DOUBLE INDEMNITY PROVISION OF THE

The third paragraph of the decedent's will evidenced a clear and unequivical intent on the part of the
deceased to make a specific bequest of the life insurance policy with the Prudential Insurance Cornpany of
America in trust for Gregory. At the time the decedent
made his will he undoubtedly had before him the Prudential policy and the information contained on the cover
sheet indentifying said policy. The policy was known
as a life insurance policy. It was designated by a number and indicated the face amount of insurance at
$5,000.00 and gave the name of the Prudential Insurance
Company of America as the insurance company involved.
In the third paragraph of his will the decedent identified the subject of his bequest by all of the foregoing
information. The provision of the will read as follows:
"I * * * give '» * * to my parents * * * rny
life insurance with the J>rlldPntiall nsnrance Company of America, Policy No. 1765570.'!."

$:i,OOO.OO

Certainly, the decedent could not have used rnore explicit
information in describing the subject of his specific bequest.
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Appellant argues that since he used the words "my
$5,000.00 life insurance," that he intended to give the
life insurance only and not the entire policy itself. We
submit that the language in the will is not susceptible
to any such interpretation; that the decedent made a
specific bequest of the policy and described it by the
only identifying data contained on the cover sheet of
the policy itself. Frankly, we do not see how anyone
could more accurately describe the policy than did the
insured. The policy itself was identified as a life insurance policy in the face amount of $5,000.00 and bearing
a particular number, all of which was incorporated hy
the de·cedent in his designation of the bequest.
Appellant further argues that the bequest is limited
because in the trust provision of paragraph 3 reference
is made to the $5,000.00 principal deriYed from the life
insurance policy and payment to the son, Gregory, of the
balance, if any, of the $5,000.00 after Gregory became
21 years of age. We do not construe this language as in
any way limiting the specific bequest referred to in the
earlier portion of the paragraph. The decedent simply
did not have in mind the possibility of his dying in an
accident and at the time he drew the \viii could not know
he was going to die in an accident the very next day. He
was simply using the figure of $5,000.00 as descriptive
of the face ainount of the policy. Certainl~v, the decedent
could not with any accuracy have referred to the amount
of the policy as being anything other than $5,000.00 or
the face amount specified therein. He spoke of the
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"principal derived from said life ilnsurance policy." It
was therefore clear that he intended the principal to go in
trust to his son. The sum of $9,995.99 was in fact "the
principal derived from sard life insurance policy." The
lower court found no trouble in dealing with the trust provisions of the will. It correctly found that the will made
a specific bequest of the entire policy including the
accidental death benefit and that the whole amount
derived from the policy was subject to the trust even
though the decedent in his will did not at that time know
that he would die in an accident and that the amount
derived would in fact be $10,000.00.
\Ve agree that intent should be gathered from a consideration of the whole paragraph, but in addition there
should also be taken into consideration the fact that
when the decedent drew his will, he had in mind protecting his son by a former marriage and his then wife.
In this connection, at the time the decedent made his
will he had two separate policies-one a $10,000.00 service policy, and the other the $5,000.00 Prudential Life
Insurance policy in question. We believe that it was the
insured's intent to give the Prudential Life Insuranee
Policy to his son, Gregory, and the proceeds of the other
policy to his wife, and that this is clearly expressed in
the will and in the specific bequest which he made of the
policy to his son.
It is argued that the deceased only intended to give
the $5,000.00 life insurance portion of the policy and not
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the accidental death benefit. If the decedent had in mind
any such distinction between the $5,000.00 face amount
of the policy and the accidental death benefit, he certainly would have so indica:ted in his will. Had he intended the result which appellant would have this Court
reach, he most assuredly would have written into the
will that the accidental death benefits of the Prudential
Life Insurance policy were not included in the bequest
and either went to his wife directly or passed under the
residuary clause of his will. The fact that he did not
so specify conclusively indicates that he considered the
policy as a whole and was making a specific bequest of
that policy and any proceeds derived therefrom in trust
for his son. The proceeds of the other policy in the
principal amount of $10,000.00 of course passed to his
second wife under the residuary clause of his will.
The fact that more than the $5,000.00 face amount
was derived fron1 the policy because of the accidental
death benefit provision does not mean that the balance
of the funds would not be impressed with any trust,
because reading the will as a whole and considering the
facts before the decedent at the time he made his will,
it is clear that he was 1naking a specific bequest of the
policy and all of the proceeds derived therefrom and
accordingly any proceeds received regardless of the
mnount are impressed with the trust, as the lower court
indicated in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment.
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If the appellant's argument were followed to its
logical conclusion, so1ne very unusual results would
follow. Assume, for the purpose of argument, that· the
appellant's interpretation is correct. Then, assume further that during his lifetime the decedent had borrowed
the sum of $2,500.00 on his life insurance. This would
leave only $2,500.00 received from the life insurance
proceeds of the policy. If the decedent intended only
the life insurance proceeds to go under the provision
of his will, then all that the son, Gregory, could receive
in trust would be the sum of $2,500.00, and yet the trust
refers to the sum of $5,000.00 upon which counsel for
appellant places so much significance. How, then, could
counsel's argument as to the bequest being only for the
life insurance proceeds of $2,500.00 be reconciled with
his argument that the use of the sum $5,000.00 in the
trust shows that the bequest was to be $5,000.00. Any
additional sum would certainly have to come out of the
accidental death benefit under the appellant's argument.
The two bases on which the appellant attempts to prove
the decedent's intent are thus inconsistent when put to
the test and would lead to opposite results. The only
reasonable interpretation is that which the lower court
placed upon the provision that the bequest was one of
the entire policy an d all of the proceeds derived there1

from.
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POINT NO.2
THE DECEASED DID NOT CONSIDER THE CONTRACTS FOR LIFE INSURANCE AND DOUBLE INDEMNITY AS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT BUT MADE A
SPECIFIC BEQUEST OF THE ENTIRE PROCEEDS OF THE
POLICY IN TRUST FOR GREGORY.

The insurance policy in question indicated that the
total amount of premium during the first fiYe years was
$14.70, and further that the total amount of premium
after the first five years was $28.10. The policy then
contained a notation: "Extra premium for accidental
means death benefit (included in total premiums) $1.30."
(Exhibit 1). The premiums were payable quarterly.
Appellant in her brief states that the law is clear
that the contract for double indemnity is separate and
distinct from the contract for life insurance, although
contained in the same policy. We cannot agree with
this statement and the authorities do not bear out the
appellant's conclusion.
Appellant quotes from 44 C.J'.S. 1286 Sec. 336 in
support of her proposition. However, appellant did not
cite the entire quotation from C.J.S. on that subject.
Following the sentence or portion thereof quoted by the
appellant in her brief is the following:
"But the rule is otherwise where the consideration for all such liabilities was one and the
same premium, and it has been held tlzat a policy
with such benefits did not constitute several contracts because a separate premium u·as charged
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
for disability benefvts where the premiums, although to some extent separable, were irntegral
parts of a single policy. * * *An industrial policy
providing for benefits for natural death and for
benefits for death by accidental means is a single
policy of life insurance, and must be considered as
a whole." (Italics ours)

See also 29 Am. J ur. page 205, Sec. 189 :
"A provision in a life insurance policy for
disability benefits, which can be obtained only
as a part of a policy of life insurance and survives only so long as the policy of life insurance
continues in existence, cannot be regarded as an
agreement independent of that for life insurance,
made in exchange for an independent consideration, although, pursuant to a requirement of the
insurance department, the policy provides that the
total premium stated on the first page of the
policy includes an annual premium of a specified
amount for disability benefits."
See also the note to said section contained in the 1953
Pocket Part reading as follows:
"It is impossible to state broadly either that
contracts evidenced by policies of life insurance
with accident or disability features are entire,
or that they are severable, or even to lay down any
single test by which the question can be determined in every case. Thus, while in a number of
cases life insurance policies with a(~eident or disability features have been held or declared to be entire, and in a number of other cases such policies
have been held or declared to be severable, it
should be kept in mind that many decisions do not
purport to go further than to hold that the par-
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ticular policy before the court should be regarded
as entire or severable in view of the particular
language used therein or of the particular circumstances under which, or of the purpose for which,
the question was raised."
See also Rhine v. New York Life Insu.rance Company, 273 N.Y. 1, 6 N. E. (2d) 74. In that case the policy
provided that the total premium was $30.30 for life
insurance and disability benefits and contained a provision that this preinium "includes an annual premium
of $2.96 for disability benefits." The court said:
"It is true that the plaintiff's policy contains
two promises which for some purposes and in
some contingencies are separable. The promise
of life insurance could be obtained without promise of additional disability benefits and for a
premium or consideration fixed as the price of
the promise of insurance alone; choice rested with
the plaintiff whether the policy should include
disability benefits for an extra premium, and
choice still rests with the plaintiff whether the
promise of additional disability benefits should be
kept alive by the continued payment of the extra
premium. The pr01nise of life insurance would
survive even if the promise of the additional
benefits, and the extra pre1nium demanded for
the inclusion of that prmnise, should be excised
from the policy. Though to that extent the promises are separable, they are none the less integral
parts of a single policy.
"The rules which govern the effect of a breach
or of the illegality of one promise, which for
some purposes is separate from other promises
contained in the same agreement, have no appli-
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cation here. We are concerned solely with the
question of whether the defendant's promise of
1disability insurance constitutes an independent
agreement made in exchange for a separate premium, though embodied in a policy which contains other promises. Concededly the promise of
the disability benefits could be obtained from the
company only as part of a policy of life insurance,
and concededly it survives only so long as the
policy of life insurance continues in existence.
The test of the divisibility of a contract has been
stated to be 'whether the parties assented to all
the promises as a single whole, so that there would
have been no bargain whatever if any promise
or set of promises were struck out.' Williston on
Contracts, Sec. 863. Since it is undisputed that
the defendant would not have consented to the
bargain for disability benefits unless it was made
as a part of a polic~T for life insurance, and since
the provision for djsability benefits can survive
only as part of the policy, it is difficult to understand how the provision for disability benefits
can be regarded as an independent agreement
made in exchange for an independent consideration.
"Policies of Hfe insurance may contain different provisions for benefits based upon varying
risks. The premium is always based upon a calculation of the anticipated cost of providing the
promised insurance or henefits. We may reasonably assume that where one form of policy contains a promise of insurance or benefits which is
not included in other forms, the premium provided
for the policy containing the additional promise
would include an extra premium for the additional
promise even though the policy does not contain
a statement to that effect. The premium fixed for
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a policy containing a number of promises might
thus represent the sum of the amounts fixed hy
calculation of each factor of cost; nevertheless
all the promises would be given to the insured in
exchange for payment of the total premium."
See also Chastang v. Mttdual Life Insurance Company of New York, 65 N.E. (2d) 873 (Ohio), Re-hearing
denied 68 N.E. (2d) 240, affirmed 71 N.E. (2d) 270. The
court said:
"The plaintiff contends that inasmuch as the
semi-annual premium in the amount of $66.00 was
broken down to show that $2.80 was the premium
for the double indemnity benefit and $7.95 the
premium for disability benefit, the court would
be justified in concluding that the policy of insurance was separable. * * * The stipulation in the
policy of the amount of the premium for the
double indemnity benefit and for the disability
benefits was made under instructions of the superintendent of insurance, so that if the policyholder wished to terminate the disability benefits
feature he would be advised as to the amount of
the premium which would be due on the life insurance policy alone. We hold that the policy of
insnrance held by the plaintiff constituted one entire contract." (Italics ours)
See also to the same effect New Y ark
Company v. McCane, 124 S.W .(2d) 1057.

L~fe

Insurance

See also 13 Appleman Insurance Law & Practice,
Sec. 7422, page 115 :
"The calling of a life contract by one name
or another does not change its character, since the
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liability of the company is determined by the
nature of the contract and not by its title. Nor
does the addition of new features to a life policy
divest it of its chief character or make it other
than a life policy.

"* * * However, a policy may contain provisions for other benefits, such as those for injuries not resulting in death, sickness or accident
benefits, or accidental death benefits without being removed thereby from the category of life insurance. The mere fact that a life policy may also
include total disability benefits would not alter
its character as life insurance. Such a policy cannot be considered purely an 'accident and health'
policy within the purview of a statute excepting
from its provisions accident and health policies."
In the case of New Y ark Life Insurance Company v.
Davis, 5 Fed. Supp. 316, cited at page 11 of appellant's
brief, the insurance company brought a suit in equity
to eliminate from three life insurance policies the disability and double indemnity provisions. The policies
would all have been voidable in their entirety for fraud
by reason of false answers to the medical part of the
application but for the incontestability clause contained
in each policy which read:
"This policy shall be incontestable after two
years from its date of issue, except for nonpayment of premium and except as to the provisions and conditions relating to disability and
double indemnity benefits."
The Court in that case correctly held under the incontestability clause that the insurance company could eli-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lH
minate the disa:bility and double indemnity provision~
from ,the policy notwithstanding the fact that the policy
as to the life portion was incontestable.
In Anair v. Mutual Life Insurance Company, -12 At.
(2d) 423 (Vt.), 159 A.L.R. 547, cited at page 12 of appellant's brief, the insured had assigned all of her right,
title and interest in the policy to a bank, following which
the bank authorized the insurance company to pay to the
insured the disability benefits of the policy. The insurance company sought to deny liability on the ground
that the policy had been assigned to the bank. Quite
reasonably, in that suit in an action against the company
the contract was held to be divisible and the insured was
properly permitted to recover for the disability benefit~
under the policy.

A similar situation was presented in Armstrong 'C.
Illinois Bankers Life Association, 29 N.E. (2d) 415 (Ind.)
131 A.L.R. 769, cited at page 13 of her brief, and here
again the policy was cons trued against the company to
pennit an action to the insured for his disability benefits,
notwithstanding the fact that the life policy itself had
been assigned to his wife. It is interesting to note, however, that even in that case the court does not go as far as
counsel in his brief and say that the la-w is clear that the
contract is always severable. We quote as follows from
the court:
"In determining whether the questioned
instrument shall be considered as constitutinobut
b
one entire contract, or as constituting two or more
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separate and independent contracts, courts and
text book writers have laid down several rules to
guide us. It is said-primarily, the question of
whether a contract is entire or severable is one of
intention, to be determined from the language
which the parties have used, and also the subject
matter of the agreement. Another inquiry is,
whether the parties reached an agreement regarding the various items as a whole or whether the
agreement was reached by regarding each item as
a unit. 2 \Villiston on Contracts, Sec. 863. AnothE•r important factor in the determination of the
question is whether the consideration is stated to
be given for each part as a separate unit or
whether there is a single consideration covering
the various parts. * * * A contract is entire when
h~· its tenns, nature, and purpose, it contemplates
and intends that each and all of its parts and the
consideration shall be common to each other and
interdependent. On the other hand, it is the general rule that a severable contract is one which in
its nature and purpose is susceptible of division
and apportionment.' "
In applying the rules laid down 1n that casP, certajnly
the insured intended and treated this contract as a whole.
In fact, he could not have bought the double indemnity
benefits separate and apart from the life insurance contract. He could have bought the life insurance without
the double indemnity benefits, hut the double indemnity
benefit was an integral part of the life insurance and
eould not stand alone or be purchased separate therefrom. As stated by the New York Court in the case of
Rhine v. New York Life Insurance Company, supra, all
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of the prmnises were given by the insurance company in
exchange for payment of the total premium. Certainly,
the insured as well as the company in the instant case intended and contemplated that both the life insurance
benefits and the double indemnity provision were common and interdependent.
In the case of Russo v. New York Life Insurance
Company, 128 S. 434 (Miss.) 69 A..L.R. 883, cited at page

14 of appellant's brief, the life policy contained a provi-

sion for sick benefits and also provided that the right
of action for any sick benefits on the death of the insured
accrued to the beneficiary. The insured was sick prior
to his death and entitled to sickness benefits under the
policy which he did not claim. Following his death, the
widow sued for the life portion only of the policy andrecovered from the company and then brought a separate
suit to recover for the disability provisions. We think the
court in that case properly held that the widow was entitled to recover also under the disability provisions since
she had not recovered the smne under the former action
and was entitled to it under the policy. The court held
that the one cause of action accrued prior to the other and
was separate and distinct and that two actions could be
1naintained. We do not disagree with this finding, but
do not believe that the case has any merit whatsoever
in detennining the issues involved in the instant case.
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The last case cited by appellant in her brief is
Chatanooga Sewer Pipe Works v. Dumler, 120 S. 450
(Miss.) 62 A.L.R. 999, in which the Mississippi court held
that the money received by the insured under a life policy
for disability benefits was not exempt under a statute
which provided that the proceeds of a life insurance
policy not exceeding $5,000.00 should be exempt from the
debts of the decedent. There are, however, numerous
cases holding to the contrary under the same set of facts,
so that there is no unanimity among the authorities in
this regard.
Nee Fox v. Swartz, 235 :Minn. 337, 51 N.W. (2d) 80,
30 A.L.R. (2d) 739. We quote from the facts as given in
the

~ummary

of the decision at the beginning of the case :

"The cash surrender value and accumulated
dividends of a fifteen-year endowment policy
were sought by an assignee of a judgment against
the insured to be subjected to the execution involved in the instant proceeding. The policy provided for payment of a stated sum to the surviving
wife or son of the insured in the event of the
latter's death prior to the maturity, hut was payable at maturity to the insured, who reserved the
rights to change the beneficiaries and to have dividends paid in cash, or applied to the payment
of premiums or to the purchase of paid-up additional insurance, or left with the insurer as an
interest-bearing savings fund payable upon death,
maturity, or prior withdrawaL The policy had not
yet matured and the withdrawal options had not
been exercised by the insured. By statute, the
beneficiaries of life insurance are 'entitled to its
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proceeds against the creditors and representatives
of the person effecting the same.' A provision of
the statute as to premiums paid in fraud of creditors was not involved in the case.
"Vacation of the levy of execution was approved by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in an
opinion by Matson, J ., which, ruling that the
statute was not unconstitutional as creating an unreasonable exemption, or a discriminatory classification as to savings and investments, held that,
prior to its maturity, the endowrnent policy had
all the characteristics of life insurance and was
within the statutory exemption from claims of
creditors; and that the cash surrender and dividend withdrawal options of the insured were
purely personal to the insured and, where unexercised, were unavailable to creditors."
Without taking more time to review the cases on
this point, we refer the court to the annotation found at
30 A.L.R. (2d) 751, wherein numerous courts have held
that policies of endowment insurance both prior to maturity and after rnaturity haYe been construed as life
policies within the terrns of the exemption laws.
See also American Trust and

Bmz.~·ing

Company v.

Lessly, (Tenn.) 106 S.\Y. (:?d) 551, 111 A.L.R. 59. In that

ease the court held that the proceeds of a poliey of insuranee against death lJ~~ accident were within the operation of the statute which provides tlrat "any life insurance
effected b~~ a husband on his own life shall, in case of his
death, inure to the benefit of his widow and child without
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being in any manner subject to his debts," holding that in
its broader sense, the term "life insurance" included
accident insurance.
There is therefore a sharp conflict in the authorities
on the question whether a life insurance policy containing
double indemnity provision in case of accidental death
is one contract or in fact two separate contracts. .Most
of the cases are decided upon the particular facts involved in each case. In cases wherein an insurance company is a party, the courts are more generally inclined
to find the contract severable, if necessary, to do justice
between the insured and the company, and prevent the
insurance company from defeating a claim by a technicality.
Appellant argues in her brief that the contract was
severable and that the insured only intended to give the
life insurance portion because of the severable nature of
the contract and the fact that he referred to "life insurance." In the first place, as we have seen, the premise upon which counsel bases his argument is not sound
as there is a sharp conflict in the authorities, and the
law is not as clear as counsel would intin1ate. In the
:-;e('oml place, the question, as we see it, is not whether
the contract was in fact one or two separate eontracts,
. but solely what the decedent intended when he made his
will. His intent is to be gathered from the language in the
will, considered under the surrounding ei remnstances,
and the fact that he owned two life insurance policies-
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one a service policy in the sum of $10,000.00, and the
other a $5,000.00 life policy with double inden1nity provision with the Prudential Insurance Company.
Certainly, if the courts cannot agree on the principle
whether the contract is to be considered divisible or not,
it is unreasonable to ascribe to the decedent a knowledge of the law and all of the various decisions in connection therewith and to say that he acted on the assumption
that the contract was divisible. Such argument falls for
another reason. If the decedent recognized the distinction
that some of the courts had made between the life insurance portion of the policy and the double indemnity portion thereof, he would have shown such distinction by the
wording in his will. Any man who recognized such a technical distinction, would not have left the matter in doubt
in his will. To a person recognizing such a technical distinction it would have been a simple thing for him to
provide that he was bequeathing the life insurance portion only of his policy and that any benefits under the
double indemnity feature were to pass under the residuary clause of his will. The fact that the decedent did
not do this is clear proof that he did not have any distinction in mind. We might add that in our opinion he had no
idea that he was going to die by accidental death. He
had two policies of insurance which he desired to cover
in his will. In 1naking the specific bequest of the one
policy in trust for his son he described it in the only way
that an ordinary and reasonable man would have done.
He used the policy number and name of the company,
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the face amount of the policy and referred to it as what
it was known to him and other people generally as a life
insurance policy. There can be no doubt that he intended
to give the policy or the entire proceeds thereof in trust
to his son.
POINT NO.3
THE BEQUEST IN TRUST FOR GREGORY INCLUDED
THE DOUBLE INDEMNITY BENEFIT.

Certainly, the decedent did not know that he was
going to die in an accident. He undoubtedly gave no
thought to the double indemnity provisions of his policy.
He had before hi1n two policies-the $10,000.00 service
life insurance policy, and the $5,000.00 Prudential Life
policy with the double indemnity provision. We believe
it is clear that he intended to give the Prudential Life
policy or all of the proceeds therefrom to his son in trust
and that the $10,000.00 service policy should pass under
the residuary clause to his wife.
Counsel cites at page 16 of his hrief the case In re:
Campbell's Estate, 27 Utah 361, 75 Pac. 851, to the effect
that the deceased must have specific property in mind
and the property must he ~o described as to he capable of
identification. \Ye have no quarrel with the Utah case.
In that case the deceased made smne provision in his will
with reference to the proceeds of mines which were not
in existence when the will was made and the portion bequeathed could only arise, and as such become property,
after the death of the testator. The court cited several
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cases with approval defining a specific legacy and among
other things quoted with approval fr01n Underhill on
Wills, Volume 1, Section 407, reading as follows:
"A specific legacy is a gift of a particular
thing or of money, specified and distinguished
from all things, and which at the execution of the
will is owned by the testator, as of a horse, or a
piece of plate, or of money in a purse, stocks of
a corporation, and the like."
Since the property attempted to be disposed of in that
case was not in existence at the time, the court held that
it was not a specific legacy and could not pass. However,
the rule when applied to the instant case is otherwise.
The Prudential Life Insurance policy with its double indemnity feature was in existence both at the time the
deceased drew his will and at the time of his death. He
described the subject particularly and with as much
definiteness as it was possible for him to do, giving the
number of the policy, the face mnount of the policy and
the nmne of the company, and referring to it as life insurance, which was the designation in fact of the policy.
F·rankly, we do not see how the decedent could have described the subject of his bequest with more particularity
and it certainly meets all of the tests of a specific bequest
as laid down by the Utah court in the case cited by
counsel.
A gift of a life insurance policy carries with it all of
the accretions as an incident to the policy itself. See
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J.l1atter of Gans, 60 Misc. 282, (N.Y.), affirmed on appeal
on other grounds in 195 N.Y. 346, wherein the court said:

.. By the fifth codicil testator gave to his brother
'Joseph Gans my life insurance of ten thousand
dollars in the .Manhattan Life Insurance Company
of the City of New York.' It appeared that he
never owned a policy in the Manhattan Life Insurance Company, but he had at the time of his
death a ten thousand dollar policy in the Mutual
Life Insurance Company. I am of the opinion that
said last-named policy was a specific legacy, bequeathed hy the testator to his said brother, and
that it carried with the gift all of its accretions."
(Italics ours)
There are a number of cases in which it has been held
that the specific bequest of a mortgage carries with it
interest accrued prior to the death. In particular see
Jlatter of Athans, 94 Misc. 43, (N.Y.) and In re Ama.ns
Estate, 5 N.Y. f;upp. 2nd, 962. In the case at bar the
double indemnity provision of the policy was an incident to the life policy and passed to the beneficiary under
the ~pecific bequest of the policy itself.
Appellant also cites the case of Waters v. Hatch,
79 S.\V. 916 (Mo.), at page 16 of her brief. In that case
the decedent held two certificates in the Bankers Life
Insurance Company of $2,000.00 each and directed that
when the money was paid that certain amounts should be
paid and certain parties given money totaling $4,000.00 or
the face amount of the certificates. Accumulations on the
policy in the amount of $190.00 in excess of the amount
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stated in the will were paid. The court held that Frank
Hatch who was bequeathed the bal. of $100.00 was not entitled to the additional accumulation because it was a
specific bequest of money. It is apparent from reading
the provisions of the will that at no time did the decedent
in that case attempt to give the certificates themselves
but was giving the money, making specific money bequests, and erroneously cornputed the money to be derived. We submit that a different result would have
been reached in that case had the decedent made a specific bequest to his son, Frank, of the certificates in question with the provision that out of the proceeds should
first be paid the items to the widow and daughters referred to. Had the deceased made such a specific bequest
of the certificates themselves, the accumulations would
have passed to the son, Frank. However, having bequeathed only the money, it was clear that the accumulations coilld not pass under the clause in the will.
The case cited by counsel is interesting for another
reason. In another clause in the will the testator bequeathed 60 shares of stock of Carthage K ational Bank,
which was all the stock the decedent owned in the bank,
and in the next clause bequeathed 20 shares of Carthage
National Bank stock to someone else. As a matter of
fact, the decedent owned 20 shares of stock in the Central National Bank of Carthage in addition to the 60
shares in the Carthage National Bank. The court in that
case held that the latter bequest should be construed to
refer to the Central National Bank stock, saying:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
··By a mistake he spoke of them as being
shares of stock in the Carthage National Bank,
instead of in the Central National Bank of Carthage. By following the letter of the will and shutting the eyes to the intention of the testator, this
provision of the will would be nullified. But, if
the intention is observed, the clause is full of
meaning. It is the duty of the court to give such
a construction to a will as will effectuate the manifest intention of the testator as discerned from the
whole will itself, and not to construe it as to cause
any of the provisions to perish."
In this case it is apparent that the decedent in tended
to make a specific bequest of the Prudential Life Insurance policy with all of its incidents in trust for his son,
and that the other policy should pass under the

T(e\Sl~

duary clause of his will. The fact that in the trust proYisions of the will he refers to the proceeds as being
$5,000.00 was only because the insured did not know
that he was going to die by accidental means and was
not thinking of the double indemnity provisions. Such
fact, however, should not prevent the insured's intent
from being given full force and effect and upholding the
specific bequest of the entire policy including the double
indemnity provision in trust for his son.
POINT NO.4
BY MAKING HIS ESTATE THE BENEFICIARY OF THE
INSURANCE POLICY THE DECEDENT EVIDENCED NO
INTENTION TO LIMIT THE AMOUNT TO GO TO GREGORY.
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Appellant argues that the various changes Inade in
the beneficiary under the policy, and in particular the
change made on September 11, 1952, making the proceeds
payable to the executor and administrator indicated an
intent on the part of the testator to limit the amount
which would go to his son. It is claimed that this intent
is shown because the decedent, in making his estate the
beneficiary of the policy, subjected the proceeds to the
claims of creditors and to other beneficiaries named in
the will. This is not true because the bequest in trust
to the son was a specific bequest. The residue of the
estate was charged with the claims of creditors.
No intent can be shown by reason of the change of
beneficiaries. The reason for the original change in beneficiary was undoubtedly because of l{enneth's divorce
frOin his first wife. vVhy the policy was subsequently
endorsed to nmne the estate as beneficiary, will probably never be known any more than the decedent's reason
for 1naking the estate the beneficiary in his $10,000.00
service life policy. The fact reinains he had two policies
both payable to the estate and the intent clearly was to
give one policy to his son, and the proceeds of the other
to his second wife, as the residuary beneficiary.
CONCLUSIONS
Like appellant's counsel, we have been unable
to find any case which is exactly in point. We submit,
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however, that the only reasonable interpretation of the
\Vill was that adopted by the lower court, namely, that
the insured intended the Prudential policy with its double
indemnity provisions to go in its entirety in trust to his
son and for the other policy to pass under the residuary
clause of the will to his wife.
We submit that there was no error in the judgment
made and entered by the lower court and that the same
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH & STRONG,

Attorneys for Respondents.
604-610 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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